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AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT

The Balzan Prize designation in my case is «International Relations: History and Theory». This designation is appropriate because I am essentially a theorist. I observe the world, identify puzzles that have not been addressed successfully, and seek to develop concepts and theories that will help illuminate these issues. Since I am not an empiricist, the ultimate significance of my work depends on other scholars, with stronger empirical interests and skills, applying my concepts to illuminate important problems. For this reason, the work of graduate students whom I have advised – almost all of whom have superior empirical skills to my own – has been crucial to the impact that my theoretical work has had. My contribution is therefore only one component of a larger whole. I am pleased that the Balzan Prize Committee has appreciated this contribution.

In this essay I will consider five aspects of my work. I began by seeking to understand the emergence of non-state actors in world politics and the rising economic interdependence of the Seventies. During the Eighties, I turned my theoretical attention to institutions. In the early Nineties I was intensely engaged with issues of research design in social science. Each of these efforts culminated in a major book. For the next twenty years I sought to use my theoretical arguments to understand changes taking place in a number of issue-areas, and to evaluate them in normative terms. Recently, I have focused on the increasing complexity of international regimes, especially in the context of the pressing problem of climate change. The Balzan Prize will now enable me to accelerate and focus work already planned on the comparative politics of climate change policy, within the context of my appreciation of the complexity of governance attempts in contemporary world politics.

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ANALYZING TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERDEPENDENCE

I received my PhD from Harvard in 1966, having written a dissertation under Professor Stanley Hoffmann, who was awarded the previous Balzan Prize in International Relations in 1997. My training was strongest on what then were considered classic theories of international relations, including works by E.H. Carr¹ and Professor Hoffmann himself.² Although Carr had discussed political-economic issues, Hoffmann's focus was on issues of war and peace, critiques of American foreign policy, and issues involving ethics and international relations. In almost all of this classic work, international politics was assumed only to involve relations *between states*.³

After five years in which I worked on themes related to my PhD dissertation on the United Nations, and then on issues relating to small states, I began, around 1970, to challenge this «state-centric» assumption in joint work with Professor Joseph S. Nye, who became not only a close colleague over almost half a century but a dear friend. In an edited volume, *Transnational Relations and World Politics*,⁴ we introduced the study of what we called «transnational» relations among societies. The entities discussed in our volume included multinational business enterprises and revolutionary movements; trade unions and scientific networks; international air transport cartels, and the Roman Catholic Church. In developing this perspective, we benefited enormously from the Center for International Affairs at Harvard and its Director, Raymond Vernon, who wrote a pioneering book on multinational corporations in 1971.⁵ We did not dismiss the significance of states, then as now the most important actors in world politics. We argued, however, that transnational relations were also important. One of their effects, we claimed, was «the creation of dependence and interdependence».⁶ Transnational actors were not necessarily subject to governmental control, and transnational relations could affect relationships between states. These claims seem like platitudes today, but they were novel in the early Seventies.

¹ *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939* (second edition). London: MacMillan, 1946.

² See especially *Janus and Minerva: Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Politics*. Boulder (Colorado): Westview Press, 1987.

³ The most important exception was an essay by WOLFERS, A. *The Actors in World Politics*, reprinted in his book of essays, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*. Baltimore (MD): Johns Hopkins Press, 1962.

⁴ Edited, with Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Harvard University Press, 1972.

⁵ VERNON, R. *Sovereignty at Bay: the Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises*. New York: Basic Books, 1971.

⁶ *Transnational Relations and World Politics: XIX*.

Nye and I then sought to theorize the concept of interdependence more systematically, beginning with economic interdependence. In *Power and Interdependence*, first published in 1977,⁷ we introduced the concept of «complex interdependence» as an umbrella term to cover the sorts of interactions we had discussed in a more descriptive way in *Transnational Relations and World Politics*. We defined complex interdependence in terms of three main characteristics: 1) *multiple channels* connecting societies; 2) *multiple issues, with an absence of hierarchy among them*; and 3) *the irrelevance of military force*. We juxtaposed complex interdependence to three key realist assumptions: that states, acting as coherent units, are the only important actors in world politics; that security issues are most important; and that force is a usable and effective instrument of policy. We did not claim that complex interdependence characterized all of world politics – this was, after all, a period of Cold War – but that among the advanced capitalist democracies there was a zone of complex interdependence. Analyzing complex interdependence through the lens of realism would provide a distorted picture of reality.

In one sense, this analysis was time-bound: we did not anticipate the end of the division of the world into market-economy societies, on the one hand, and state socialist economies, on the other. But in another sense, relations among the market economy countries were a harbinger of the future, as formerly socialist countries opened their borders. We characterized complex interdependence as operating within a limited sphere; later it became much more extensive. As a result, our political economy analysis undertaken during the Cold War became more relevant, while much of the work on security during this time period became irrelevant.

Professor Benjamin J. Cohen generously argues that the idea of complex interdependence «broke new ground». Here was a wholly different alternative to IR's then-prevailing paradigm – a fresh vision of the world that contrasted sharply with the realist model of unitary states single-mindedly preoccupied with the high politics of war and peace. Here was real value-added. Keohane and Nye made us look at the world anew. In so doing, they facilitated the birth of a «new field of study».⁸

Power and Interdependence's second theoretical contribution was to connect interdependence – economic, strategic, and ecological – with power. In preparing the ground for this argument, Nye and I distinguished be-

⁷ KEOHANE, R.O. – NYE, J.S., Jr. *Power and Interdependence* (third edition). Boston: Addison-Wesley Longman, 2001, p. 11.

⁸ COHEN, B.J. *International Political Economy: an Intellectual History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008, p. 30.

tween two types of interdependence – sensitivity and vulnerability. Sensitivity interdependence refers to how quickly and fully changes in one country bring about changes in another. Global oil prices, shifts in Federal Reserve monetary policy, and terrorist appeals on social media all illustrate sensitivity dependence: actions in one part of the global system diffuse to many other locales. More important for power dynamics, we argued, is vulnerability interdependence, which we defined as a situation in which the costs of sensitivity dependence persist even after that actor adjusts its policies to the changed situation.⁹ For instance, whether a country targeted by an oil embargo would suffer vulnerability as well as sensitivity dependence would depend on whether it had access to other energy supplies. Asymmetrical vulnerability interdependence is a source of power in world politics because it generates more costs for one party than for the other, generating bargaining leverage for the less vulnerable party.

This argument moved the discussion of economic interdependence, already common in the economic policy literature, into the sphere of politics, connecting the two disciplines and helping to revive the study of international political economy, after disciplinary developments had driven economics and political science apart.

More generally, as Professor Andrew Moravcsik has insightfully pointed out,¹⁰ the analysis in *Power and Interdependence* drew attention to the role of state preferences in ways that enhance our understanding of world politics. Leaders of States can be interpreted most of the time as acting in ways that incorporate at least limited or bounded rationality. That is, subject to uncertainty in the environment and their own cognitive biases, they seek to devise policies that are likely to realize their preferences and to identify strategies that seem well-suited to enable these policies to be implemented. The consequences of the resulting interactions will depend heavily on what their preferences are and how each party's preferences are interpreted by others.

I have argued ever since the publication of *Transnational Relations and World Politics*¹¹ that state preferences can be complementary rather than entirely opposed to one another, enabling bargains to be made that render each party better off. That is, world politics is potentially non-zero-sum

⁹ KEOHANE – NYE, *Power and Interdependence*, cit., p. 11.

¹⁰ “Robert Keohane: Political Theorist.” In *Power, Interdependence, and Nonstate Actors in World Politics*, eds. Milner, H.V., and Moravcsik, A. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009, pp. 243-263.

¹¹ Edited, with Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972.

rather than zero-sum. This claim is quite different from classic Realism, as in the work of Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth N. Waltz.¹² In practice, the successes of the European Union, and of the extensive institutionalized cooperation of the seventy years following World War II, both reflect beliefs by leaders in a non-zero-sum international politics and demonstrate the viability of such beliefs.

Unfortunately, the current US administration has failed to learn this lesson. In an op-ed in the *Wall Street Journal* on May 25, 2017, Gary Cohn and H.R. McMaster – two of President Trump’s top advisors – wrote that «the world is not a “global community” but an arena where nations, non-governmental actors and businesses engage and compete for advantage». The confusion in this sentence is one of the fallacies that I have spent my career trying to dispel. Of course, the world is not a «global community». In communities, people know one another well and share common values. But the world is a «global society», characterized by increasing mutual interdependence, in which «competing for advantage» in a zero-sum way is ultimately futile. Focusing on competition in which one side wins and the other loses forecloses opportunities for *mutually beneficial* – not altruistic – cooperation and can even lead to war.

DEVisING AN INSTITUTIONALIST THEORY OF WORLD POLITICS

After the publication of *Power and Interdependence*, I moved to a new phase of my work, with a greater emphasis on institutions. Once again, I began with dissatisfaction with the realist orthodoxy.¹³ As I wrote in 1989, discussing my work of the late Seventies and early Eighties, «If the realist emphasis on conflicts of interest and power were correct, how could so much cooperation persist in world politics?»¹⁴ In a realist world, the decline in the dominance of a hegemonic power should lead to sharply increasing discord and perhaps even the formation of economic blocs. Yet de-

¹² MORGENTHAU, H.J. *Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948 and many subsequent editions; WALTZ, K.N. *Theory of World Politics*. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979.

¹³ The following discussion of my thought process between 1978 and 1984 leading up to the publication of *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), draws heavily on an essay that I wrote in 1989. See “A Personal Intellectual History”, Chapter 2 of KEOHANE, R.O. *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1989.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

spite the apparent decline in US preponderance, cooperation persisted, and even increased in energy policy among the advanced capitalist countries in response to the oil shock. Furthermore, multilateral institutions – considered to be weak and often inconsequential by realism – were increasing in number and in policy scope.

In other words, for realist theory institutionalized cooperation was an *anomaly* in the world politics of the Seventies and Eighties. Identifying anomalies is crucial for a theorist, since anomalies – against the background of conventional theory – suggest that something is wrong with the theory. Anomalies identify *puzzles* for the theorist.¹⁵

In 1978 and 1979 these anomalies came more sharply into focus for me as a result of the work of Kenneth N. Waltz, whose *Theory of International Politics*, published in 1979 but foreshadowed in his previous writings, was a sophisticated and logically rigorous restatement of realism. In Waltz's view, cooperation in world politics is necessarily shallow and tenuous, and institutions should be weak. As I wrote with a colleague, «the very clarity of Waltz's argument made it difficult to evade the anomaly created by the fact of institutionalized cooperation».¹⁶

I had little idea about how to resolve this anomaly until I attended a conference in 1978 with the famous economic historian, Charles P. Kindleberger, who discussed the implications for international relations theory of transactions costs, uncertainty, and risk. This clue led me to a literature in organizational economics, aided by an economist colleague at Stanford, James Rosse. By the end of 1979 I had sketched out some notes for a paper that became «The Demand for International Regimes», the theoretical core of my 1984 book, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. In a 1989 essay I reported that «I can still remember the “aha” feeling, in my fourth-floor office at Stanford in December 1979, when I glimpsed the relevance of theories of industrial organization for understanding international regimes».¹⁷ In this context, an international regime is a set of rules and institutions that stabilizes expectations among participants, with respect to a particular set of issues that arise between them.

¹⁵ The key work that led me to understand scientific progress in terms of the resolution of anomalies is by IMRE LAKATOS, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes.” In *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, eds. Lakatos, I., and Musgrave, A. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

¹⁶ KEOHANE, R.O. – MARTIN, L.L. “Institutional Theory as a Research Program.” Chapter 3 in *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field*, eds. Elman, C., and Fendius Elman, M. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003, p. 73.

¹⁷ See KEOHANE, R.O. *A Personal Intellectual History*, p. 28.

The core insight behind «the demand for international regimes» paper and *After Hegemony* was that multilateral institutions should not be seen as sets of rules and norms imposed on states, but rather as devices *created by states to achieve their purposes*. What purposes? As Kindleberger had implied, valuable institutions reduce the costs of making bargains with one another and enhance the credibility of those bargains in a world of uncertainty. Insofar as international institutions reduce transactions costs, provide information, enhance the credibility of bargains, and reduce uncertainty by creating rules, states should support them, and even accept constraints on their own behavior if others reciprocate.

As I explained in *After Hegemony*, the world in which these institutions operate is not one of harmony but rather of actual or potential discord. The actors in world politics – state and non-state – have divergent interests and may have antithetical values. Crucially, as realists have emphasized, there is no reliable government able to enforce a single set of rules. Yet the discord takes place against the background of preferences that are not absolutely incompatible: there is typically some zone of agreement that will represent an improvement for each actor, although not necessarily to the same degree. In economic terms, there is a «Pareto frontier». For two actors, this curve depicts the set of bargains that cannot be improved upon for both partners. If the status quo lies within the Pareto frontier, bargains can be made that improve the situation for both sides – but only insofar as issues such as uncertainty and high transactions costs can be overcome. Effective institutions resolve these issues and enable the actors to improve their situations without coming to full agreement on underlying interests and values. Discord continues – but areas of cooperation can emerge.

At this point, my work on institutions converged with Robert Axelrod's analysis of what he called «cooperation under anarchy».¹⁸ Axelrod developed a now-famous Prisoners Dilemma tournament, using computer simulation in an evolutionary framework, with the game extending to a thousand generations. It turned out that the most robust strategy – of all those submitted by experts in related fields – was what he called «tit for tat», simply doing on each round what the one's partner (or «opponent») had done on the previous round. In other words, a strategy of reciprocity was the most effective in inducing cooperation in this game.

My argument in *After Hegemony* was remarkably similar, and in 1985 Axelrod and I co-authored an article on «Achieving Cooperation under An-

¹⁸ AXELROD, R. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books, 1984.

archy»¹⁹ in which we emphasized what Axelrod had called the length of the «shadow of the future» as a facilitating condition for cooperation. We identified four features that promote cooperation: 1) long time horizons; 2) regularity of stakes; 3) reliability of information about others' actions; and 4) quick feedback about changes in other actors' behavior. In effect, my theory of international institutions converged with Axelrod's evolutionary theory of cooperation, emphasizing reciprocity and the role of factors that promote it. In a subsequent article,²⁰ I distinguished between «specific reciprocity», as in Axelrod's tit-for-tat strategy, and what I called «diffuse reciprocity» in which one's partners are defined more broadly as a group of cooperating players. As I said there, «diffuse reciprocity involves conforming to generally accepted standards of behavior». In other words, diffuse reciprocity requires institutions incorporating rules that provide these acceptable standards.

This line of work has broader implications, beyond explaining cooperation and understanding institutions. Classical theories of international relations not only focused too narrowly on states; they assumed that information is a constant. But as I wrote in an essay published in 1983, «information is not a systemic constant. Some international systems are rich in information; in other systems, information is scarce or of low quality».²¹

States, according to realism, exist in a world of great uncertainty as well as risk; hence they have to protect themselves even against unlikely existential threats. At the limit, such a view implies treating even allies and collaborators as potential enemies – an assumption that can itself generate conflict. Yet this assumption is mistaken, since states have considerable information about the beliefs and expectations of other countries; non-state actors can also make comparable judgments. Furthermore, and crucially, by constructing institutions that require transparency, states can collectively generate information-richer environments, reducing uncertainty and the pathologies that it can generate. This error of realism – ignoring *variability in the informational environment and the endogeneity of such variability to state policy* – is perhaps the deepest error of all.

An interesting extension of my work on international cooperation derived from the my reading of Elinor Ostrom's *Governing the Commons*:

¹⁹ *World Politics* 38-1, October 1985, pp. 226-254.

²⁰ KEOHANE, R.O. *Reciprocity in International Relations*, International Organization, v. 40, n. 1, Winter 1987, pp. 1-27.

²¹ KEOHANE, R.O. "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond." In *Political Science: the State of the Discipline*, ed. Finifter, A.W., Washington, DC, American Political Science Association 1983, p. 531.

the Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, published in 1991,²² which formed the core of the work for which she received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2009. I read this work on publication and immediately saw that Ostrom's principles for effective collective action on local commons problems – such as irrigation and fisheries – were virtually identical to my conclusions about the conditions for international cooperation. Both arguments depended on reciprocity as a strategy and on relatively low discount rates (a long «shadow of the future») and on the availability of information, in part as a result of systematic monitoring. Professor Ostrom and I then organized two workshops and published a book systematically comparing the two domains.²³

ENUNCIATING PRINCIPLES OF RESEARCH DESIGN

I find theory an intrinsically satisfying activity, although it is admittedly a specialized taste. For most students of international politics, theory is important as a set of questions and hypotheses but not as an endpoint. They want empirically grounded answers. In the end, so do I.

In the late Eighties and early Nineties, most of the empirical work that sought to evaluate and test theories such as my own was qualitative in nature, relying on historical accounts and case studies. Qualitative work still plays that role, although over the last quarter-century there have been impressive advances in quantitative work, some of which is relevant to big, important questions. In the late Eighties and early Nineties, however, there was no standard protocol for how qualitative researchers should seek to do scientific analysis in a way that would enable comparison among studies and reliable assessments of their quality. Often it was difficult to distinguish qualitative political science from history. All too often, investigators selected cases to study on the basis of the value of the dependent variable – for example, only looking at successes of a given strategy or institution. Any inferences drawn from such studies are flawed since only some real-world outcomes are considered.

At this time I was Chair of the Harvard Government Department in a time of expanding budgets and faculty size, so I had to attend many job talks. It was frustrating to me that very often the presentations were flawed

²² New York: Cambridge University Press.

²³ KEOHANE, R.O. – OSTROM, E. (eds.), *Local Commons and Global Interdependence: Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Two Domains*. London: Sage Publications, 1995.

by elementary errors such as «selecting on the dependent variable». However, our department was not systematically teaching qualitative research design; so it became immediately obvious that our students were probably committing the same errors. In response, the famous political scientist Sidney Verba, a young methodologist by the name of Gary King, and I decided to teach a graduate seminar on this topic.

The seminar seemed to be a success, and the three instructors learned from one another; so we planned to teach it again. Before doing so, Gary said: «We are going to use this course to write a book». Over the course of three to four years, we hammered out a set of arguments, both in our seminar and in my office – a welcome relief from bureaucratic tasks. As we reported in the preface to *Designing Social Inquiry*, «our intellectual battles have always been friendly but our rules of engagement meant that “agreeing to disagree” and compromising were high crimes. If one of us was not truly convinced of a point, we took it as our obligation to continue the debate. [...] This book is a statement of our hard-won unanimous position on scientific inference in qualitative research».²⁴

Designing Social Inquiry articulated a unified logic of inference for social science, whether the work was considered «quantitative» or «qualitative». In the opening chapter, we emphasized that any theory identifies «observable implications» which need to be empirically tested before the validity of the theory can be assessed. A key research design task is to maximize the number of observable implications of a theory, in any domain – not necessarily the one in which the original puzzle appears. That is, social scientists need to *maximize leverage*.

Chapter 2 of *Designing Social Inquiry* discusses «descriptive inference», defining it as «the process of understanding an unobserved phenomenon on the basis of a set of observations».²⁵ For example, one might want to estimate the underlying strength of the Conservative vote in Britain in 1979 on the basis of actual observations of elections during that year – each one affected by local peculiarities from the weather to the occurrence of short-term political crises. Using observed phenomena to make inferences about general phenomena is a difficult but essential task of social science, and should be clearly distinguished from «mere» description.

Chapter 3 develops a set of rules for making causal inferences, the core of the social scientific enterprise. Throughout, we emphasize the im-

²⁴ KING., G. – KEOHANE, R.O. – VERBA, S. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

portance of stating theories in a way that generates empirically falsifiable propositions.

Chapter 4 analyzes what the investigator should observe, showing how selection on the dependent variable (the outcome to be explained) biases inference. Perhaps the most important precept in our book is that social scientists should select on the basis of explanatory, or independent variables. Selection on the explanatory variable – then observing the outcome regardless of what it turns out to be – avoids inferential bias. The major lesson of this analysis for social scientists is to be very clear on which of one’s variables refer to outcomes (the dependent variables) and which refer to potential causal factors (the explanatory variables) and to design studies in ways that select cases on the latter.

Chapter 5 of *Designing Social Inquiry* discusses omitted variable bias and measurement issues, then considers the difficult issue of endogeneity: in which «the values our explanatory variables take are a consequence, rather than a cause, of our dependent variable».²⁶

Finally, Chapter 6 offers advice to qualitative researchers – who may seem inherently to have few «cases» to study – on how to «make many observations from few», increasing the number of observable implications of their theories. The final sentence of this chapter, and the book, summarizes the argument: «Valid inference is possible only so long as the inherent logic underlying all social scientific research is understood and followed».²⁷

Judging from the growth since 1994 in the number of qualitative methods courses offered in political science graduate school, the continuing sales of the volume, translations into foreign languages, and citations in the social science literature, *Designing Social Inquiry* essentially achieved its purpose.

INTERPRETING MAJOR CHANGES IN WORLD POLITICS

World politics changed immensely with the end of the Cold War. No longer divided between East and West, Europe quickly developed new international institutions and the European Union rapidly expanded. Globally, interdependence became much more extensive, coming under the encompassing heading of «globalization», denoting the vast expansion of transnational relations and the movement of money, goods, people, and

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 230.

pollution across state boundaries. It became even clearer that variations in domestic politics exert major effects on globalization and institutionalized attempts to govern it. International institutions continued to be invented. In particular, during the Nineties major attempts were made to reconstruct security institutions and to build international environmental regimes in response to increasing awareness of the transnational character of environmental issues. Lawyers and legal scholars went to work trying to legalize multilateral institutions, making multilateral rules more precise, delegating authority more explicitly, and in particular seeking to increase the obligatory nature of international rules. Some democratic states and non-governmental organizations sought to change the rules of intervention in world politics, seeking to legitimize «humanitarian intervention» when human rights were abused by governments or threatened by the failure of state structures. Finally, in the wake of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 (which I publicly opposed), anti-American sentiment increased around the world, but took notably different forms in different places.

Along with colleagues at Harvard and elsewhere, I sought to use the «institutionalist theory» that I had helped to create to understand all of these changes in world politics. *After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991*²⁸ explored the institutional changes generated by the collapse of Soviet power in Europe. *Internationalization and Domestic Politics*²⁹ examined how domestic politics affected responses to what is now called globalization in a variety of countries, including China, Japan, Russia, and the United States. *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space*³⁰ analyzed security institutions from the Concert of Europe to NATO. *Institutions for the Earth*³¹ and *Institutions for Environmental Aid*³² examined efforts to establish international environmental regimes. *Legalization and World Politics*³³ discussed how some international institutions were becoming more legalized, with more precise rules, clearer obligations, and greater delegation of authority – for instance to quasi-judicial arbitration procedures. *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal,*

²⁸ Harvard University Press, 1993. Edited by Keohane, R.O., Nye, J.S., and Hoffmann, S.

²⁹ New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Edited by Keohane, R.O., and Milner, H.V.

³⁰ Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Edited by Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R.O., and Wallander, C.A.

³¹ Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993. Edited by Haas, P.M., Keohane, R.O., and Levy, M.A.

³² Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996. Edited by Keohane, R.O., and Levy, M.A.

³³ Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001. Edited by Goldstein, J.L., Kahler, M., Keohane, R.O., and Slaughter, A.-M.

*and Political Dilemmas*³⁴ viewed humanitarian intervention from the perspectives of international law, moral philosophy, and political science. *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics* dissected various types of anti-Americanism and concluded that «we will only be able to understand anti-Americanism if we shine a search light into all corners of the world while also holding up a mirror to ourselves». I have sought both to test institutionalist theory and to illuminate rapid changes in world politics.³⁵

ENGAGING IN NORMATIVE EVALUATION

Throughout my career, I have occasionally written explicitly normative essays, seeking to articulate my own liberal and cosmopolitan values in a way that respects the severe realities of sovereignty in what Hedley Bull called the «anarchical society» of world politics.³⁶ In *International Liberalism Reconsidered*, I sketched out what I called «sophisticated liberalism», encompassing aspects of commercial, republican, and regulatory liberalism. Although I was critical of aspects of liberalism, I argued that «a realistic liberalism, premised not on automatic harmony but on prudential calculation, has a great deal to commend it as a philosophy of international relations», and concluded that it «constitutes an antidote to fatalism and a source of hope for the human race».³⁷ In my Presidential Address to the American Political Science Association in September 2000, published the next year, I declared that our objective as students of world politics «should be to help our students, colleagues, and the broader public understand both the necessity for governance in a partially globalized world and the principles that would make such governance legitimate».³⁸ With respect to the United States public, we have clearly not succeeded in this task.

³⁴ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Edited by Holzgrefe, J.L., and Keohane, R.O.

³⁵ Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007. Edited by Katzenstein, P.J., and Keohane, R.O., p. 316.

³⁶ BULL, H., *The Anarchical Society: a Study of Order in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. My normative interests mark me, more than otherwise, as truly the student of my PhD advisor, Stanley Hoffmann.

³⁷ Originally published in a volume edited by John Dunn, *The Economic Limits to Modern Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). The quotations appear on pp. 57 and 59 of my collection of essays, *Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World*. London: Routledge, 2002.

³⁸ KEOHANE, R.O., «Governance in a Partially Globalized World.» *American Political Science Review*, 95, 1, March 2001, p. 11.

In 2009, along with two Princeton colleagues, I suggested that although international organizations have been perceived to have a «democratic deficit», in a variety of ways they can enhance the quality of national democratic processes.³⁹ I engaged in more sustained normative analysis in two other co-authored essays. With Ruth W. Grant, my colleague for a decade at Duke University, I wrote *Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics*. Grant and I explicitly defined accountability and declared that it «implies that the actors being held accountable have obligations to act in ways that are consistent with accepted standards of behavior and that they will be sanctioned for failures to do so».⁴⁰ We distinguished two general models of accountability, focused respectively on participation and on delegation, and we specified seven mechanisms of accountability in world politics, each of which applies in specific situations and each of which is imperfect. Normatively, we advocated the creation of genuine accountability arrangements in world politics inspired by democratic theory, while operating under constraints specific to the nature of the global system. With Allen Buchanan, a philosopher at Duke, I developed what we called a «complex standard» for evaluating the legitimacy of international institutions – once again, a standard consistent with democratic theory but forged in awareness of the limitations on democratic practices imposed by world politics.⁴¹

UNDERSTANDING REGIME COMPLEXITY AND THE COMPARATIVE POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY

In recent years, I have returned to my earlier emphasis on international regimes, but this time with an awareness that during this century, we have seen the emergence of «international regime complexes» – clusters of institutions governing relationships within an issue-area – more than coherent international regimes. Some of these institutions represent organizations of states; others are informal networks involving both states and non-state actors; some provide examples of what Jessica Green has called «private authority».⁴² In *The Regime Complex for Climate*

³⁹ KEOHANE, R.O. – MACEDO, S. – MORAVCSIK, A. “Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism.” *International Organization* 63, Winter 2009, pp. 1-31.

⁴⁰ *American Political Science Review*, v. 99, n. 1, February 2005, pp. 30-31.

⁴¹ BUCHANAN, A. – KEOHANE, R.O. “The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions.” *Ethics and International Affairs* 20, 4, 2006, pp. 405-437.

⁴² GREEN, J. *Rethinking Private Authority: Agents and Entrepreneurs in Global Environmental Governance*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.

Change,⁴³ David G. Victor and I described the climate change regime complex as it existed after the failure of the Kyoto Protocol, and I have continued to explore the dynamics of what a colleague and I later called «contested multilateralism».⁴⁴

My recent work on regime complexes and climate change forms a natural bridge to my Balzan Prize project. This project will engage younger scholars, along with myself, in a systematic analysis of the comparative politics of climate change policy, within the context of attempts at global governance that involve both interstate and transnational relations. I intend this project to integrate my normative commitment to improve the world; my analytical work on the politics of interdependence and international institutions; and my work on research design for social science.

Multinational institutions for governing climate change depend on state policies, as well as the activities of transnational actors. Quite a bit of recent work focuses on the transnational dimensions of climate politics, but we do not sufficiently understand the sources of state policy. That is, we have little systematic analysis of the comparative politics of climate change: the conditions under which the climate policies and practices of state and non-state agents are likely to change, and in what directions. Specifically, under what conditions will these agents devote more effort to responding effectively to anthropogenic climate change? What political strategies will they follow to achieve their objectives? Under what conditions will they favor policies that are more or less centralized; that depend more or less on direct regulation or policies that rely on markets; that depend more or less on coercion or on changing or reinforcing social norms?

I propose to lead a research group of young scholars to analyze this complex system in an explicitly comparative way. The core idea is not merely to produce a set of first-rate studies, but to **create a new field: the comparative politics of climate change policy**, contextualized within a sophisticated understanding of world politics. In seeking to create this new field, this project will be *comparative in method, simultaneously theoretical and empirical, and deeply collaborative*.

Comparative analysis generates variety in outcomes and focuses on a variety of explanatory variables to explain these patterns. Science is largely about describing and explaining variation. The units for the comparison can be nation-states, but as noted above, they can also include provinces, or

⁴³ *Perspectives on Politics* 9, 1, March 2011, pp. 7-23.

⁴⁴ MORSE, J.C. – KEOHANE, R.O. "Contested Multilateralism." *Review of International Organizations* 9, 2014, pp. 385-412.

states within countries, cities, corporations, business associations, and non-profit entities. We can compare actions of the same entities over time as we can examine how they respond to changing conditions.

The subject of our inquiry includes clean energy policy as well as policies explicitly designed to mitigate adverse effects of greenhouse gasses. Our analysis will include developing as well as developed countries, authoritarian and quasi-authoritarian states as well as democracies, statist and market-oriented political economies.

This study will be both *theoretical and empirical*. It will consider multiple levels of analysis: sub-national, national, international, and transnational. In a complex system such as this one, it is meaningless to seek sharply to distinguish «international relations» from «comparative politics». Investigators need to understand the sources of different national policies before analyzing multilateral institutions and negotiations. In turn, those institutions and negotiators, and the transnational networks that surround them, can affect the domestic politics of participants. The project will be guided by a thorough understanding of theory of world politics.

Although guided by theory, the project will also be deeply empirical. It will constitute *evidence-based social science*, conducted according to scientific principles that require specification of theory, deriving the observable implications of theory, specifying hypotheses that embody these observable implications, and testing the hypotheses with relevant data, which may be qualitative as well as quantitative.⁴⁵ We will take into account normative issues, but only with a solid grounding in a positive understanding – theoretical and empirical – of climate change policy processes and institutions. The positive work in this project can involve any kind of social scientific method, ranging from agent-based simulations to experimental work, statistical modelling and data analysis, comparative case studies, and ethnography.

Finally, this research project will be *non-hierarchical and collaborative*. I will offer advice and guidance to the scientific investigators, but not direction. The investigators will have constructed their own theories and hypotheses, and will use methods that they find appropriate, as long as they are social scientific and comparative. They will publish their work under their own names and with collaborators of their own choosing. They will also commit to freely sharing their ideas and findings with other members of the research group, which will gather initially on a face-to-face basis and will interact in appropriate ways, as a group, throughout the life of the

⁴⁵ The principles to be followed are laid out in KING – KEOHANE – VERBA, *Designing Social Inquiry*, cit.

project. I believe that individuals or small sets of collaborators, not large groups, do the best work in social science; but that criticism and discussion are essential even for brilliant ideas to have their optimal development and expression.